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THE PROBLEMS OF INSIDER TRADING AND
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN BROKER-DEALERS?
Christopher M Gorman*
INTRODUCTION
The once-thriving "new" American economy is a thing of the past
with the bursting of the dot-com bubble. After the huge losses in the
financial markets, investors and the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") have focused on cases of fraud in the financial
markets. The SEC has continued its long-standing focus on insider
trading in broker-dealers, but it has now begun to concentrate on
conflicts of interest, particularly conflicts of securities analysts.'
"Chinese Walls" are an important element of broker-dealer regulation
because they attempt to resolve both of these problems. Traditionally, a
Chinese Wall has been an information barrier that prevents insider
trading.2 Recently, the SEC and Congress have advocated the use of a
Chinese Wall as a structural technique to help reduce analysts' conflicts
of interest.'
. J.D., Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, May 2004; B.S., summa cum
laude, Finance, Providence College, May 2001. I would like to thank my wife,
Samantha, my parents, Kathy and Paul, and my brothers, Stephen and Daniel, for their
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1. Lori Richards, Remarks at the 2002 Internal Auditors Division Annual
Conference (Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch59l.htm
(last visited Dec. 27, 2003).
2. NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION: PRIVATE RIGHTS
OF ACTION § 1.02[C] (2d ed. 1997).
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); see
also POSER, supra note 2.
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Chinese Walls may partially control conflicts of interest and insider
trading; however, this success comes with some significant costs. There
may be more efficient and effective techniques available to deal with the
problems of insider trading and conflicts of interest. This Note will
begin by exploring the statutory basis for the prohibition of insider
trading and its evolving definition. Part I will then explain why conflicts
of interest exist in broker-dealers. Part II will discuss the origin of
Chinese Walls, give examples of the policies and procedures they
typically employ and discuss their advantages and disadvantages. Part
III will present additions to Chinese Walls and alternatives that may
better prevent insider trading and reduce conflicts of interest. Finally,
this Note will conclude that Chinese Walls, whether used conceptually
to prevent insider trading or structurally to prevent conflicts of interest,
are inefficient, largely ineffective and have more shortcomings than
advantages. Chinese Walls will only prevent insider trading at the
broker-dealer level, but instances of insider trading by insiders and their
tippees will continue to occur. In addition, the best solution to analysts'
conflicts is a scheme where investors are given the ability to make their
own fully informed decisions.
I. BACKGROUND ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND INSIDER TRADING
A. Insider Tradingz: Statutory Basis for the Prohibition and Developin'
Case Law of its Definition
A Chinese Wall is the primary weapon used to prevent insider
trading.4 Insider trading is the illegal trading of a security based on
material, nonpublic information. In a multi-service broker-dealer, the
investment banking department usually obtains this material, nonpublic
information through its relationship with corporate clients. The
investment banker then shares this information with the firm's retail
brokers, who make trade recommendations to their customers based on
this information. For example, a corporate client may disclose to an
investment banker that it will be making a tender offer for another
4. See POSER, supra note 2.
5. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 223-27 (1980) (defining the
elements of insider trading).
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corporation.6 The investment banker may then share this inside
information with a retail trader, who will then recommend that his
customers purchase shares of the target firm's stock. Once the news of
the tender offer is released to the public, the client will then be able to
sell the shares for a profit.' This is a classic example of insider trading.
The prohibition of insider trading is principally based on four
statutory sources. These sources are: (1) Section 10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 19348 (hereinafter "Exchange Act") and SEC Rule
lOb-5 passed thereunder;9 (2) Section 16 of the Exchange Act; "0
(3) Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 14e-3 passed
thereunder; 2 and (4) statutory amendments passed in the 1980s to the
Exchange Act. 13 The most important source is Rule 1Ob-5, which makes
it unlawful:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.'
4
There is no specific reference to insider trading anywhere in the
rule. The prohibition is based on the fact that the person who trades on
6. This news typically increases the value of the target firm's stock. See Karmel,
infra note 15.
7. The client will make money since he purchased an undervalued security that
appreciated in value once the inside information was released to the public. He was
then able to profit by selling the shares after the market incorporated this information
into the price of the target firm's stock.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2003).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2003).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2003).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2003).
13. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(codified as amended in scattered subdivisions of 15 U.S.C. § 78); Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677
(codified as amended in scattered subdivisions of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78, 80b-4a).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
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inside information is either using a scheme to defraud in violation of
subsection (a) or is engaging in a fraudulent act in violation of
subsection of (c). 15 The fraud is based on the failure of the party in
possession of the inside information to disclose it to the other party. 6
Since there is no explicit statutory definition of insider trading, it
has been established through controversial case law. One important
issue is the definition of inside information. Inside information initially
meant information concerning a company's assets or earning power that
affected the stock price. 17  Thus, traditional insider trading usually
involved trading by directors, officers, and employees of the
corporation.' s This definition has expanded over time to include
"market information," which is any information that affects the market
for a company's security, not just information affecting the company's
assets or earning power. 9 This more expansive definition of inside
information has led to individuals besides traditional insiders being
found guilty of insider trading.20 Today, courts do not make the
distinction between these two types of information. 2' Therefore, trading
based on traditional inside information as well as outside information is
considered insider trading in violation of Rule 1 Ob-5.
Another important issue under insider trading law is who can be
found guilty of insider trading. Under the traditional, or classical, theory
of insider trading, a person violates Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 when
a corporate insider trades the company's stock based on material,
15. Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information - A Breach
in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 83, 86-87 (1998).
16. Id.
17. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
18. Insider trading initially involved these individuals since they were the only
ones with the ability to obtain information relating to the company's assets or earning
power.
19. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S.
222 (1980). Market information is often referred to as "outside information" because it
is usually obtained from outsiders such as investors, traders, brokerage firms, and
others. Karmel, supra note 15, at 87.
20. Under this new definition of inside information, analysts and underwriters are
now more frequently convicted of insider trading. See id. at 83.
21. RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL
§ 2.01[2] (1995).
22. Id.
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nonpublic information.2" Under this theory, only those individuals who
owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders are guilty of
insider trading.24 The term "insider" has expanded under the classical
theory to include temporary insiders such as attorneys, investment
bankers or accountants. The theory also now includes trades of tippees,
or persons who obtain inside information from an insider.2' These
corporate insiders obtain inside information from a relationship of trust
and confidence with the corporation and its shareholders, so they may
not use it to take advantage of uninformed individuals. They are under a
duty to either disclose all material, nonpublic information or abstain
from trading in the corporation's securities.26 The classical theory
requires the presence of a fiduciary relationship between the insider and
shareholders because "[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon
nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak. 2 7 Thus, the
classical theory does not cover trades of outsiders who obtain material,
nonpublic information from a method besides the breach of an insider's
duty.28 In response to this problem, prosecutors have urged courts to
adopt the misappropriation theory to find these individuals guilty of
insider trading.
The misappropriation theory has been used to cover instances of
"outsider trading." Under this theory, a person who trades on
wrongfully obtained material, nonpublic information is liable solely for
misappropriating this information, regardless of the trader owing any
fiduciary duty.29 This theory holds that the person who trades on this
information pretends to be loyal to the source of the information, thus
creating a deceptive device in violation of subsection (a) of Rule 1Ob-
5.30 Thus, the misappropriation theory bars this trading because the
23. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-30.
24. Since the classical theory requires the presence of a fiduciary duty, it applies to
trading by corporate insiders such as directors or officers, and to temporary fiduciaries
such as accountants, attorneys, and consultants. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14
(1983).
25. See id. (discussing tippees and their liability for insider trading).
26. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
27. Id. at 235.
28. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654-55.
29. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
30. Steven Amchen et al., Securities Fraud, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1037, 1053
(2002).
2004)
480 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LA W
trader is betraying some obligation owed to the source of the inside
information, irrespective of the source owing any duty to the corporation
or its shareholders. Therefore, this theory provides the government with
an alternative method to the classical theory to prosecute instances of
insider trading.
Another controversial issue in insider trading is the "possession
versus use" debate.31 The issue here is when a person must abstain from
trading based on inside information.32 The "use" view says that the
person should abstain from trading only when he is using the inside
information as the basis for the trade.33 The "possession" view argues
that the person subject to the disclose or abstain duty is required to
abstain from trading due to the mere possession of inside information,
even if that information is not the basis for the trade.34 The possession
standard is based on the idea that it is difficult for a person to possess
inside information and purchase or sell a security without using that
information. The SEC has attempted to resolve the dispute by adopting
Rule 10b5-1, which states that a purchase or sale of a security is on the
basis of inside information when the person is aware of the material,
non-public information.3' There is significant debate over whether this
"aware" standard has resolved any of the difficulty arising from the
'possession versus use" debate.
B. Conflicts of Interest and Why They Exist
The second problem Chinese Walls attempt to address is conflicts
of interest in multi-service broker-dealers. A conflict of interest is "a
situation in which the self-interest of a person may conflict with a
fiduciary duty that he owes to another, or in which a person has
potentially conflicting fiduciary duties to two or more persons.' 36 A
broker-dealer can frequently find itself in a situation where the firm's
self-interests conflict with the interests of its client, or alternatively,
where the interests of two of the firm's clients are at odds with each
31. Id. at 1056-57.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2003) (emphasis added).
36. POSER, supra note 2, at § 1.02.
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other. Conflicts of interest exist in broker-dealers for two principle
reasons.
One reason conflicts of interest exist is the compensation scheme in
the brokerage industry.3 7  Broker-dealers are compensated based on
commissions, and they also give investment advice and exercise trading
discretion over some customers' accounts.38  A broker-dealer has an
incentive to encourage his customer to trade frequently since he earns a
commission based on each trade. 39 The broker-dealer's self-interest in
maximizing his commission will conflict with the customer's interest in
maximizing his return on investment, which is usually done by holding a
security for an extended period.4 ° Commissions can also influence the
specific security that the broker-dealer recommends to a customer.41
Generally, commissions are higher for lower-priced, riskier securities
than the commissions for higher-priced, safer securities.4 2 Therefore,
broker-dealers seeking to maximize their compensation are likely to
recommend that a customer frequently buy and sell securities,
particularly risky securities, even if this is not in the customer's best
interests. This compensation scheme clearly fails to align the interests
of broker-dealers with the interests of their customers.
The second reason conflicts of interest exist in broker-dealers is
because of the multiple functions the broker-dealers perform. 43 Broker-
dealers engage in numerous financial activities.44 In today's economy of
"mega-firms," a broker-dealer often engages in some or all of the
following activities: (1) retail and institutional brokerage, including sales
and research; (2) portfolio management; (3) mutual fund management;
(4) trading for the firm's own account; (5) underwriting of public
offerings and private placements; and (6) investment banking, including
giving financial advice to corporate clients.45 As a result of these wide-
37. Id.
38. Id. at § 1.02[A].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Ellen E. Schultz, Getting Started: Failing to Consider Commissions Can Be
Costly Error, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1991, at C1.
43. See POSER, supra note 2, at § 1.02.
44. Id. at § 1.02[A].
45. Id.
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ranging activities, a broker-dealer can face numerous conflicts of
interest.
The conflict of interest that has received the most press recently is
analysts' conflicts. This conflict arises from the difficulty in trying to
serve both corporate and individual clients.46 As discussed above,
broker-dealers typically provide research through their analysts, sales
through their brokers and underwriting services to corporate clients.47 A
broker-dealer is very mindful of the fact that a significant source of
revenue for the firm is its underwriting activities. 48 Therefore, there is
often concern that "analysts' recommendations might be colored by their
firms' investment-banking ties. 49 Analysts might be persuaded to issue
overly optimistic reports about a corporate client. Issuing a negative
report would obviously upset the corporate client, who may threaten to
take its lucrative underwriting needs to another firm. Thus, the broker-
dealer has a compelling interest in making its corporate client happy
with its analysts' reports. At the same time, customers have an interest
in obtaining an objective analyst's report when deciding whether or not
to purchase a corporation's securities. Clearly the customer's interest in
obtaining unbiased, reliable research information conflicts with the
broker-dealer's interest in maintaining its profitable investment banking
relationship with its corporate clients.
III. CHINESE WALLS AS A WEAPON TO FIGHT INSIDER TRADING AND
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A. Background
The Chinese Wall is the primary weapon used to combat the
problems of insider trading and conflicts of interest in broker-dealers.5"
Chinese Walls were initially voluntary policies and procedures
46. Charles R. Schwab, Remaking the Market: My Investors, My Responsibility,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2002, at A22.
47. See POSER, supra note 2, at § 1.02[A].
48. Id.
49. Judith Bums, Brokers' Group Has Mixed View of Rules Plan - Proposal to
Curb Conflicts of Interest for Analysts Provokes Some Criticisms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17,
2002, at B5.
50. See POSER, supra note 2, at § 1.02[B].
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established by broker-dealers themselves, but the SEC eventually made
them a statutory requirement for all firms.5 The term "Chinese Wall" is
a metaphor used to describe a broker-dealer's internal rules and
procedures designed to prevent insider trading and manage conflicts of
interest.52 A Chinese Wall attempts to "wall in" information obtained
from one department and prevent this inside information from being
disseminated throughout the firm. 3 It also attempts to physically
segregate the investment banking department from the brokerage,
research and other departments of the firm. 4  This segregation is
designed to prevent investment bankers from exerting influence on
analysts' research reports.
Chinese Walls first came into existence in 1968 as part of a
settlement between the SEC and Merrill Lynch. 5 Merrill Lynch was the
lead underwriter for a potential public offering of debentures by Douglas
Aircraft Company.56 Merrill Lynch learned that the company was about
to issue a revised estimate of its earnings with substantially lower
figures. Merrill Lynch's underwriters gave this information to the sales
department, who in turn told several mutual funds and other large
institutional clients.5 7  During the three-day period before Douglas
publicly disclosed this information, Merrill Lynch and its clients sold the
stock to avoid substantial losses.5 8 As part of the settlement Merrill
Lynch reached with the SEC, the firm adopted a Statement of Policy that
"prohibits disclosure by any member of the Underwriting Division of
material information obtained from a corporation.., and not disclosed
to the investing public."5 9 In effect, this Statement of Policy established
the first Chinese Wall. 0
After the Merrill Lynch settlement, other brokerage firms
voluntarily implemented Chinese Walls to prevent the SEC from
51. See id. at § 1.02[C].
52. See id.
53. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE PLI ORDER NO. B4-6872, Apr. 27, 1989, at 558.
54. Marc I. Steinberg & John Fletcher, Compliance Programs for Insider Trading,
47 SMUL. REV. 1783 (1994).
55. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968).
56. Id. at 935.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 938.
60. See POSER, supra note 2, at § 1.02[C].
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targeting them in an insider trading investigation. 6' However, these
Chinese Walls often proved futile as numerous allegations of insider
trading continued to arise.62 Congress responded by making Chinese
Walls a statutory requirement under Section 15(f) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which was adopted as part of the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.63 It states that "[e]very
registered broker or dealer shall establish, maintain and enforce written
policies and procedures reasonably designed ... to prevent the
misuse.., of material, nonpublic information."'  This statutory
requirement has been the subject of numerous SEC enforcement actions
against broker-dealers. 65  Therefore, broker-dealers carefully design,
implement and monitor all Chinese Wall procedures to avoid SEC
enforcement action.66
Although Chinese Walls exist principally to prevent insider trading,
their formation serves other important purposes. One compelling benefit
of Chinese Walls is to help ensure the integrity of research reports and
other recommendations made by securities analysts. 67  The recent
emphasis on analysts' conflicts of interest has motivated the SEC,
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (hereinafter "NASD"),
and New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (hereinafter "NYSE") to propose
rules advocating the use of Chinese Walls to restore analysts'
independence.68  The Chinese Wall attempts to maintain analysts'
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 956 F. Supp. 503 (1997);
S.E.C. v. Levine, 689 F. Supp. 317 (1988).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(f), 80b-4a (2003).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933
(1968); Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 177 F.2d 398 (1974).
66. ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE & REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS
§20:171 (2003).
67. Emily Thornton, Wall Street's Chinese Walls Aren't Strong Enough, Bus. WK.,
Aug. 27, 2001 at 56; Lynn Strongin Dodds, Analysts Demanding Stronger Chinese
Walls to Fight Conflicts, FIN. NEWS, Apr. 22, 2002.
68. The NASD has proposed a new rule 2711, and the NYSE has proposed
amendments to its Rule 472 (Communications with the Public). See NYSE and NYSE
Rulemaking, Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Changes by the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Research
Analyst Conflicts of Interest (Mar. 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45526.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
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independence by separating the research and investment banking units,
so that analysts are not subject to review or pressure by the investment
bankers.69  The hope is that "[i]f research operates independently
... analysts could express their true views on stocks without fear of
cramping the style of investment bankers, who typically earn the bulk of
~ ,,70most firms' income. Chinese Walls thus attempt to eliminate, or at
least reduce, the conflict between the interests of the investment banking
department and investors who rely on analysts' recommendations and
research reports.
B. Typical Policies and Procedures of a Chinese Wall
The specific policies and procedures of a Chinese Wall are left to
each individual broker-dealer considering the nature of its business.7'
However, there are certain minimum elements and standards that a
Chinese Wall should employ to be effective. Preventing communication
between the various departments of a broker-dealer is the essence of a
Chinese Wall.72 To achieve this goal, the firm should separate
departments with frequent access to confidential information from the
departments that trade securities or give investment advice.73 One
method to enforce this separation is restricting access to files, offices,
and computers. 74 Some firms may ensure this separation by locating
their investment banking and sales departments on separate floors, or
even in different buildings.75  Physically locking up sensitive
information, shredding sensitive documents once they are no longer
needed and using code words or names in sensitive documents are other
techniques to prevent the dissemination of inside information.76
69. Thor Valdmanis, Rules in the Works to Curb Conflicts; SEC Works with Stock
Exchanges, Investment Banks, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 2002, at B01.
70. Amey Stone, A Chinese Wall or Several Fences?, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Oct. 14,
2002, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/oct2002/nf20021014_9355.htm (last
visited Dec. 27, 2003).
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(f), 80b-4a (2003).
72. See FERRARA, supra note 21, at § 10.02[2].
73. Id.
74. See POSER, supra note 2.
75. Id.
76. See FERRARA, supra note 21, at § 10.02[2].
2004]
486 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORA TE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LAW
The SEC's Division of Market Regulation has emphasized that
observance, continuing education and review of the broker-dealer's
trading are also important elements of a Chinese Wall. The report
recommended that "firms memorialize in greater detail their procedures,
and likewise improve the documentation, communication and record-
keeping associated with their Chinese Wall activities. 77  To further
achieve these goals, firms should have formal written codes of ethics
that every employee should read, understand and contractually agree to
obey.78 The SEC's report also stated the need for continuing education
to update and enforce the firm's policies. 79 Lastly, the report identified
the use of watch lists and restricted lists to supplement Chinese Walls
and review compliance with them. °
Despite the elaborate policies and provisions of Chinese Walls,
their existence has been hotly debated.8 The SEC maintains that they
are effective and necessary to prevent insider trading and control a large,
multi-service broker-dealer's conflicts of interest.8 2 Opponents of
Chinese Walls argue that they are an ineffective and inefficient method
to deal with these problems, and there are better alternatives available.83
This Note will now present the advantages and disadvantages of Chinese
Walls and discuss if there are better alternatives available to prevent
insider trading and reduce conflicts of interest.
77. Broker-Dealer Policies and Procedures Designed to Segment the Flow and
Prevent the Misuse of Material Non-public Information, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,520, at 80,619 (Mar. 1990) [hereinafter Broker-Dealer
Policies].
78. Joint Memo on Chinese Wall Policies and Procedures, NASD Notice to
Members No. 91-45 (June 21, 1991).
79. See Broker-Dealer Policies, supra note 77, at 80,627.
80. Id. at 80,623-80,627; see discussion infra Part IV.A for watch lists and
restricted lists.
81. See generally Stone, supra note 70 (discussing alternatives to Chinese Walls).
82. See generally Laura S. Unger, How Can Analysts Maintain Their
Independence? (Apr. 2001) (discussing analyst independence and the need to upgrade
or enforce Chinese Walls), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch477.htm
(last visited Dec. 27, 2003).
83. See POSER, supra note 2.
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C. Advantages of Chinese Walls
Chinese Walls are an important weapon in the battle against insider
trading. As discussed earlier, insider trading is illegal,84 and Chinese
Walls attempt to prevent insider trading by preventing the flow of
material, nonpublic information.85 Chinese Walls also have a beneficial
purpose for the broker-dealer. "At the same time that Chinese Walls
contain information within a department, they also allow other
departments to act freely without fear of 'contamination. ,8 6 Chinese
Walls allow a broker-dealer to still engage in trading activities even if its
investment bankers receive material, nonpublic information. 7 If a retail
trader discovers material, nonpublic information, the firm would have its
hands tied and be prevented from trading since this would be a violation
of insider trading laws. A Chinese Wall segregates this information
from the retail traders so that they can continue to engage in trading
activities without any fear of being tainted and guilty of insider trading.
Chinese Walls also provide broker-dealers with a defense to an
insider trading allegation under Section 21A(a) of the Exchange Act.
Thus, the use of a Chinese Wall makes it less likely that the SEC will
prosecute the firm for insider trading even if one of its employees
engages in insider trading. Although Chinese Walls are not an absolute
defense to liability, 9 they do serve to decrease the likelihood that a
broker-dealer will be found guilty of insider trading. This illustrates yet
another benefit Chinese Walls offer to broker-dealers.
There are convincing public policy interests to enforce the ban on
insider trading, and Chinese Walls attempt to serve those interests.
There is an inherent unfairness in insider trading. Nearly every
developed country has some form of laws in place prohibiting insider
trading. Some insider trading legislation has been passed because of the
belief that "insider trading threatens... markets by undermining the
84. See supra Part II.A.
85. See supra Part III.A.
86. FERRARA, supra note 21, at § 9.01.
87. Id.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-I(b)(1)(B) (2003).
89. See Manne, infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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public's expectations of honest and fair securities markets where all
participants play by the same rules."9
When someone trades on inside information, honesty and fair play
are no longer present in the market. The insider is unfairly profiting
from information he obtains because of his inside connection with the
firm. The rest of the market is unable to obtain this information until the
firm decides to publicly disclose it. In a market where this type of
trading is permitted, insiders will be able to take advantage of
unsuspecting outsiders. Therefore, Chinese Walls attempt to enforce
fairness and confidence in the securities markets by ensuring that
insiders will not be able to engage in dishonest transactions and benefit
at the expense of unknowing investors.
When a broker-dealer trades or makes recommendations based on
inside information, the firm is betraying the confidence of its corporate
clients. The firm's clients are sharing material, nonpublic information
with investment bankers to obtain financial advice. They do not intend
for the investment bankers to betray their expectation of confidence by
disclosing the information to retail traders. There is a clear conflict of
interest in this situation. On one hand, the corporation has an interest in
keeping the information confidential and obtaining sound advice. On
the other hand, the broker-dealer has an interest in using this information
for its own financial gain. Chinese Walls ensure that the broker-dealer
will not disclose the information to retail traders, thus protecting the
interest of corporate clients.
Chinese Walls also attempt to reduce the harm caused to other
potential corporate shareholders when insider trading occurs.91 Nagy
discusses one rationale why insider trading must be prevented: when an
insider purchases shares based on inside information, this insider's trade
preempts any possible trade by an outsider.92 If it were not for the
insider's trade, Nagy argues that an outsider would have been able to
execute the trade and recognize a profit when the firm releases the
information to the public.93 Thus, Nagy argues that insider trading robs
90. H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 2 (1984) (stated upon passage of The Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984).
91. Donna M. Nagy, The "Possession vs. Use" Debate in the Context of Securities
Trading by Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never be Golden, 67 U. CiN. L. REV.
1129, 1152 (1999).
92. Id. at 1189.
93. Id.
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the rest of the investing public of an opportunity to invest in a profitable
company.
94
An obvious flaw with this argument is that today's markets are
extremely liquid and diverse. Therefore, this outsider will still have
numerous other opportunities to still purchase the corporation's stock;
the insider's trade is really not preventing an outsider from purchasing
the security. However, the uninformed shareholder who sells his shares
to the insider is harmed. He is not aware of the impending positive news
for the corporation, and he is deprived of the profit he would make when
the corporation discloses the positive information. This profit is
transferred to the insider, thus depriving the profit to the previous
shareholder. Chinese Walls prevent insider trading and thus preserve
the profits of existing shareholders and protect them from exploitation
by insiders.
Perhaps the most important function of Chinese Walls today is their
role in helping a broker-dealer manage its analysts' conflicts of interest.
There is tremendous pressure on analysts to issue favorable reports on
behalf of their firms' corporate clients.95 Charles Schwab states that
there is a "profound crisis of trust" where investors don't know what to
believe when it comes to analysts' recommendations.96 This crisis arises
from the fact that most analysts' recommendations "have been shown to
be more about smoothing the relationship between investment bankers
and CEOs than about providing sound information to ordinary
investors." 97 The reason for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was a
concern that investment banks weren't maintaining Chinese Walls
between retail brokerage and underwriting.98 The SEC, Congress,
NASD and NYSE have all turned to Chinese Walls to minimize
analysts' conflicts. 99
Chinese Walls establish strict rules and procedures to separate
analysts from investment bankers to maintain the reliability and
independence of analysts' reports. The prevalence of analysts' conflicts
can be neither overstated nor denied. In a recent study, it was stated that
94. Id.
95. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
96. See Schwab, supra note 46.
97. Id.
98. S. REP. No. 107-205, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, July 3, 2002, at 34.
99. Id. at 34-38.
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analysts hardly ever issued sell recommendations for a security because
of the influence of the firm's investment bankers)00 These statistics
proved that sell recommendations comprised less than two-percent of all
analysts' recommendations.' ' Clearly analysts were very reluctant, if
not terrified, to issue an unfavorable recommendation. Some may argue
that this only proves that analysts were overly optimistic; it does not
prove that analysts were influenced by their firm's investment banking
ties. However, another recent study revealed that analysts who work for
firms with investment banking activities have 6% higher earnings
forecasts and 25% more buy recommendations than analysts employed
by firms with no underwriting activities.0 2  Other studies further
evidencing analysts' conflicts state that recently the buy-sell ratio was
66 to 1, compared to only 6 to 1 less than a decade ago. 0 3 These studies
uncover the disturbing fact that analysts' recommendations, frequently
relied on by investors, are biased and influenced by the broker-dealer's
investment banking relationships. 1°" Chinese Walls attempt to resolve
these analysts' conflicts by structurally separating analysts so that they
are not influenced or pressured by the firm's investment bankers. The
hope is that Chinese Walls will improve the disturbing results of the
studies discussed.
D. Disadvantages of Chinese Walls
A Chinese Wall does not entirely stop the flow of inside
information and prevent insider trading, nor does it always reduce
analysts' conflicts of interest. 105 Chinese Walls are more successful in
preventing the accidental flow of inside information than they are in
preventing purposeful misconduct and conspiracies to share inside
100. In one study it was revealed that 29% of recommendations were strong buy,
37% buy, 31% hold, 1% sell and 0.4% strong sell. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Virtue and
the Securities Analyst, N.Y. L.J., July 19, 2001, at 5.
101. Id.
102. Reporting, Accounting Oversight: Hearings Before the Senate Banking
Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of John C. Coffee,
Jr., Professor, Columbia University School of Law) (citing a CFO Magazine report).
103. See Coffee, supra note 100.
104. Id.
105. See POSER, supra note 2.
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information. 10 6 Since a Chinese Wall is not successful in preventing an
investment banker from intentionally disclosing inside information to
retail traders, these deliberate disclosures of inside information will
continue to occur. Chinese Walls also won't be able to prevent insider
trading by classic insiders of the corporation and their tippees. These
instances of insider trading, which are more common than insider
trading resulting from the breach of a Chinese Wall, will still continue in
the markets despite a broker-dealer's Chinese Wall.
A different problem arises if a Chinese Wall is successful in
preventing the sharing of inside information. A Chinese Wall may
prevent a large multi-service firm from fulfilling its duty of undivided
loyalty to customers.0 7 According to this fiduciary duty, a broker-dealer
must disclose to its customers all material facts within its knowledge
that in any way affect the transaction.'0 8 The existence of a Chinese
Wall may prevent retail traders from using information obtained from
investment bankers to satisfy this duty of the firm's retail traders.
In Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., a broker-dealer's retail
brokers recommended the stock of one of its corporate clients, Tidal
Marine.'0 9 During this same period, the underwriters of the firm had
apparently received information that Tidal Marine was expected to
suffer heavy financial losses because its fleet of tankers had been
damaged in a typhoon."0 Shearson's Chinese Wall hid this information
from its retail brokers, who continued to recommend the stock to their
customers."' One of Shearson's customers bought the stock based on
Shearson's recommendation and then sued the firm under Rule lOb-5,
claiming that the firm had a duty not to recommend the stock." 2
Shearson claimed that its Chinese Wall provided a legal defense to the
claim, but the district court rejected this defense." 3 The court held that
Shearson voluntarily entered into conflicting fiduciary relationships with
retail customers and corporate clients, so the firm could not recognize its
106. See FERRARA, supra note 21, § 9.01.
107. See POSER, supra note 2.
108. Penrod v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 385 N.E.2d 376, 380
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
109. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398, 400 (2d Cir. 1974).
110. Id. at 401.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 400.
113. Id.
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duty to one while disregarding its duty to the other.1 4 Therefore, even
though a broker-dealer established a Chinese Wall that proved effective
in preventing the flow of inside information, the firm still faced liability
for not using this information to withdraw its buy recommendation on
the stock."'
Although the Slade case was eventually settled without any
definitive ruling, it illustrates the potential "jackpot" that a broker-dealer
can potentially face. The broker-dealer has a duty of confidentiality to
its corporate clients. Simultaneously, the firm has a duty to its retail
customers to disclose all material facts affecting the transaction." 6 This
puts the broker-dealer in a catch-22 position. If the firm obeys its
Chinese Wall and duty of confidentiality to corporate clients, it will be
subject to suit by its retail customers for failing to disclose the adverse
information.'7 Alternatively, if the firm discloses the information to its
retail customers to fulfill its duty to disclose all material facts, it will
face suit from its corporate clients for disclosing the information in
violation of its duty of confidentiality." 8 Further, the firm will then face
regulatory action by the SEC for insider trading. This example shows
that although Chinese Walls may be successful in helping broker-dealers
prevent insider trading, compliance with a Chinese Wall can have
unsolvable, adverse consequences for the firm.
Another problem with a Chinese Wall is that "the
compartmentalization of information accomplished by a Chinese Wall
may increase rather than reduce the conflict-of-interest problems."'' 9 A
Chinese Wall withholds information from a department of the firm that
could use the information to benefit its customers. This clearly may be
inconsistent with customers' expectations. Customers expect that their
broker-dealers will be their loyal representatives and serve their interests
foremost. A Chinese Wall may run counter to these expectations. For
example, investment bankers may know that a firm is restating its
earnings because of accounting fraud. However, a Chinese Wall will
keep this information from retail traders, who may continue to
recommend this company's stock. Although a restricted list may
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, supra note 90 and accompanying text.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. POSER, supra note 2, at § 9.01.
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prevent the firm from recommending the stock, the broker-dealer will
still have to remain silent if a client wishes to purchase the security.
Customers' expectations of being informed of all information available
to the broker-dealer is entirely reasonable because an agent owes his
principal a duty to disclose all relevant information that the agent knows
regarding the transaction. 20  Therefore, a broker-dealer's interest in
obeying its Chinese Wall to avoid liability for insider trading will
conflict with the customer's interest in being fully informed about all
material facts affecting the transaction.
Chinese Walls are partly unsuccessful because of the lack of strong
incentives for broker-dealers to establish and supervise compliance with
them. If a large firm is unable to share information among its different
departments, there are several advantages that are lost. These include
cost savings, opportunities for collective thinking and other synergies of
combining and integrating various departments.12 ' When a broker-
dealer can integrate its trading and underwriting activities, the
underwriters, who are very familiar with their corporate client, can share
this information with retail traders and analysts. With a Chinese Wall,
analysts have to perform their own research of a corporation. The
analysts may never discover some information that the investment
bankers know, or they will duplicate the information that investment
bankers know, but at a significant cost. This is one reason why
opponents of Chinese Walls argue that they are extremely inefficient.
Not everyone agrees that insider trading should be prohibited, and
hence they argue that Chinese Walls are unnecessary. The law and
economics school argues that insider trading prohibitions create market
inefficiencies and should be eliminated. Insider trading can benefit
markets by promoting efficiency through the swift incorporation of new
information into the marketplace. 122 This should reduce volatility in the
markets and promote economic efficiency. Insider trading also may be
an appropriate method of compensating executives and entrepreneurs
without causing any significant injury to other investors.2 3  The
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §381 (1958); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-
355, supra note 90 and accompanying text.
121. See POSER, supra note 2.
122. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation ofInsider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983).
123. Henry G. Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, HARV. BUS. REv., Nov.-Dec.
1966, at 113.
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argument is that the ability to capitalize on inside information is a
benefit of working for the corporation, similar to an employee's ability
to exercise stock options. Thus, insider trading should just be another
economic benefit to employees. Another argument is that given the
huge amount of time and money needed to combat insider trading, it is
not worth the cost to ban an activity that may encourage economic gains
to society."2 4 The argument that insider trading should be allowed is
based on economic theories and gives little weight to policy concerns of
fairness and honesty. However, these concerns may outweigh the
possible economic gains to be achieved from insider trading.
IV. ADDITIONS TO CHINESE WALLS AND ALTERNATIVES TO CONTROL
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND PREVENT INSIDER TRADING BESIDES
CHINESE WALLS
A. Watch Lists and Restricted Lists
The SEC has proposed one method to deal with the dilemma of
conflicting duties presented in the Slade case. 125 To assist broker-dealers
in dealing with this problem, the SEC has proposed that a firm use a
"restricted list" in addition to a Chinese Wall. No employee at the firm
would be allowed to make recommendations or solicit trades for a
security on this list. If a customer makes an inquiry about such a
security, he would be told that the firm is unable to make
recommendations or give advice regarding that security. An obvious
problem with this is that the firm's placing of a security on the restricted
list may be equivalent to revealing the adverse information itself,
particularly if the firm previously recommended the security. 26 If the
firm has an outstanding buy recommendation on a security, it will place
the security on a restricted list if it obtains adverse information. This
will rescind the recommendation but also keep the information
124. See FERRARA, supra note 21, at § 1.01.
125. As discussed previously, Chinese Walls could place a broker-dealer in a "catch-
22" where disclosing a corporate client's confidential information may make the broker
dealer liable to the corporate client; however, failure to disclose this material
information to a retail client may make the firm liable to retail clients. See discussion
supra Part III.D.
126. Id.
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customers. However, the placement of the security on the restricted list
signals that the firm has obtained negative information because
otherwise it could continue to recommend the security. The SEC has
attempted to address this problem by stating that the firm should place a
security on the restricted list as soon as it enters into any relationship
"likely to result in the receipt of inside information."'' 2 7 Obviously, this
is not a very precise rule and may result in inconsistent application and
uncertainty by broker-dealers regarding their potential liability. A
restricted list is merely an addition to a Chinese Wall, so all the
disadvantages of Chinese Walls still exist.
28
Broker-dealers typically employ watch lists in addition to Chinese
Walls and restricted lists. Implicit in the use of watch lists and restricted
lists is the assumption that Chinese Walls are insufficient to prevent the
flow of inside information. A watch list is a list of securities whose
trading is monitored by the firm's compliance department, but there are
no formal trading restrictions placed on them.2 9 The watch list is the
most important element of Chinese Wall review procedures.1 30 This list
enables the firm to determine if the Chinese Wall is effectively
preventing the flow and misuse of material, nonpublic information. A
watch list is only successful in detecting insider trading after it has
already occurred, so it does not serve to improve the effectiveness of a
Chinese Wall. Restricted lists, in contrast, attempt to prevent insider
trading in the beginning. These attempts at improving Chinese Walls
ultimately have proved ineffective and simply perpetuate their
disadvantages.
B. The Emergence of Discount Brokers
The changing demographics of broker-dealers will play an
important role in reducing broker-dealers' conflicts of interest as well as
reducing the occurrences of insider trading.'3' One important
development has been the advent of discount brokers. In 1975, the SEC
and Congress prohibited the stock exchanges from fixing the
127. Brief of Amici Curiae S.E.C. at 12, Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517
F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
128. See discussion supra Part ITI.D.
129. See Broker-Dealer Policies, supra note 77, at 4 n.12.
130. See FERRARA, supra note 21, at § 10.03[1].
131. See POSER, supra note 2.
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and Congress prohibited the stock exchanges from fixing the
commissions charged by their members. 32 This event paved the way for
the emergence of discount broker-dealers.'33 Discount firms typically
only provide trade execution and clearing services and do not have
research or investment banking departments. 1
3 4
Since discount brokers do not perform investment banking services,
there is less opportunity for these firms to engage in insider trading. As
discussed earlier, the largest source of inside information in broker-
dealers is their investment banking relationship with their corporate
clients. 3 ' With the lack of an investment banking department, there will
be no source of inside information in a discount broker, and therefore no
opportunity to engage in insider trading. The increasing number of
discount brokers underscores the fact that most insider trading violations
seen today do not arise from the sharing of inside information within a
multi-service broker-dealer. 3 6 Insider trading more frequently arises in
connection with trading based on material, nonpublic information by
corporate insiders and their tippees.'37 This calls into question if
Chinese Walls are necessary and able to prevent the type of insider
trading prevalent today.
The only major disadvantage of discount brokers is that customers
may have to go elsewhere if they want the investment advice usually
offered by full-service firms. However, this advice comes at a price in
the form of analysts' conflicts. Perhaps the best approach may be for a
customer to use research reports from independent research firms and
then use a discount broker to execute the desired trade. This may be
more expensive for investors, but reliable, valuable research will not
come cheap. Thus, this scheme will eliminate the potential for analysts'
conflicts. Another way for investors to obtain financial advice in this
scheme is for discount brokers to begin to provide some investment
advice to their clients. This advice won't be colored like analysts'
reports from large multi-service firms because discount brokers do not
have underwriting departments to influence their advice. Although these
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See discussion supra Part II.A.
136. See POSER, supra note 2.
137. See, e.g., Irving Kristol, How to Restructure Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1,
1991, at A14.
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firms may have to increase the fees they charge customers, this approach
provides investors with a choice. If customers want cheaper financial
advice that may be biased, they can get this from multi-service broker-
dealers. If they want more objective research advice, they can obtain it
from discount brokers or independent research firms. Using either
approach, the investor has the choice of what to do, rather than
mandating the use of an ineffective and inefficient Chinese Wall.
C. Segregation of Broker-Dealer Activities
Some have proposed complete segregation of the various activities
of broker-dealers, much like the Glass-Steagall Act once segregated the
functions of investments banks from commercial banks. 13' This
separation is tantamount to a severe Chinese Wall, where investment
banking and retail services will be separated so that no firm can offer
both of these services to customers. This will prevent insider trading
because a broker-dealer will be unable to obtain inside information from
a client through its investment bankers and pass this information on to
traders in the retail department. A firm with retail traders will only be
able to engage in trading activities, so it won't have an underwriting
department with the potential to receive inside information. Likewise, if
a firm offers underwriting activities, it will not be able to have a trading
department, so underwriters will have no retail traders with whom to
share the information.
This segregation would also prevent a firm from offering research
and analyst advice at the same time it offers investment banking. This
will also help solve the conflicts of interest problem. This separation
will prevent underwriters in the firm from asserting pressure on analysts
to issue favorable reports for the firm's corporate clients. Under this
proposal, there is a higher probability that analysts' reports will be more
objective and reliable for investors.
However, there are several significant drawbacks to this approach.
One is that segregation would prevent broker-dealers from recognizing
economies of scale that could be achieved by combining various
financial services. The benefits of segregation may outweigh this loss,
but it still must be considered in conjunction with the other drawbacks.
Another problem is that segregation may be a naive solution. Just as
138. Id.
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Chinese Walls have not completely eliminated all conflicts of interest
and instances of insider trading, segregation will not completely
eliminate these problems. An investment banker at one firm can just as
easily call a friend who is a retail broker for another firm and share
inside information. Similarly, an investment banker can call a friend
who is an analyst and ask for a favorable report. Given these drawbacks
and the realities of the marketplace, it is likely that any segregation
would eventually give way to the integration of services we have today.
This is precisely what has happened today in the banking industry as the
segregation of various banking and other financial services has
disappeared with the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
D. Full and Immediate Disclosure ofAll Information
Another feasible and realistic solution to the problem of insider
trading is to encourage full and prompt disclosure of all corporate
informnation." 9  This rule will eliminate the existence of inside
information. If all information is immediately disclosed to the public,
all parties to the transaction will have access to the same information.
Nicholas Wolfson has suggested that if an investment banking client of a
broker-dealer does not make timely disclosure of inside information, the
investment banker should have an obligation to make the disclosure on
behalf of his client.14° However, corporations may no longer use
investment banking services as frequently because of the possible loss of
confidentiality. This disadvantage must be balanced with the benefits of
such a rule. Even a more lenient disclosure requirement will eliminate
inside information, and Chinese Walls will no longer be necessary if
there is no longer inside information in broker-dealers.
There also needs to be better and more disclosure about the
relationships in broker-dealers that might create conflicts of interest.1
4
'
This will allow clients to make their own informed decisions about the
reliability and objectivity of analysts' reports. Rather than requiring
firms to erect Chinese Walls, disclosure would be a better solution to
139. A.H. Hermann, Prompt Disclosure Can Pre-Empt Insider Trading, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 1988, at 23.
140. Nicholas Wolfson, Investment Banking, in Twentieth Century Fund Report,
Abuse on Wall Street: Conflicts of Interest in the Securities Markets, at 413 (1980).
141. See Schwab, supra note 46.
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analysts' conflicts. Many naive investors assume that Chinese Walls are
sufficient to keep investment bankers from asserting pressure on
analysts. These investors rely on analysts' reports and discover the hard
way that the analyst was not as objective as they thought. Stricter
disclosure rules would cause investors to think about analysts'
recommendations before they naively accept them as unbiased. This
rule will clearly benefit investors more than the current focus on Chinese
Walls, which have proved ineffective in reducing analysts' conflicts.
Similar to the use of discount brokers, this approach leaves the ultimate
decision regarding analysts' objectivity up to the investor rather than
mandating the use of ineffective and inefficient Chinese Walls.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the current emphasis on Chinese Walls is misplaced.
Although they may be partially successful in curbing insider trading and
minimizing conflicts of interest, there are significant drawbacks that
outweigh the benefits. Even with the existence of Chinese Walls, there
has been and will continue to be many instances of insider trading.
Chinese Walls may prevent cases of insider trading in broker-dealers,
but there will continue to be numerous instances of insider trading by
inside officers and their tippees. Chinese Walls will not prevent these
instances of insider trading, which are the most common cases of insider
trading. Increased disclosure and enforcement of these disclosure rules
will eliminate the presence of inside information in the markets,
preventing all forms of insider trading.
Although Chinese Walls may reduce analysts' conflicts of interest,
this will come with significant costs. In the end, the best solution may
be to leave the choice about the reliability of analysts' reports to
investors. Discount brokers and independent research firms provide
investors with the option of obtaining investment advice that won't be
biased by a broker-dealer's investment banking ties. Increased
disclosure about possible conflicts will also place the decision about the
reliability of analysts and their reports in the hands of investors. In the
end, honesty and full disclosure in the markets is necessary, not
inefficient and ineffective Chinese Walls.
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